Universities are increasingly faced with central city decline; anchored by their assets-primarily real estate-and, sometimes, institutional missions, many have felt threatened by neighborhood deterioration. In response, several universities have intervened in neighborhood decline over the last two decades, initiating revitalization and physical improvement strategies. Since 1996, the University of Pennsylvania has been a leader in this work, investing in the West Philadelphia Initiatives (WPI) to address safety, vacancy, and disinvestment concerns. This study utilizes Census data to evaluate changes in the character of University City between 1990 and 2010. Analysis suggests that, contrary to popular belief, the neighborhood improved but did not gentrify. The story, however, does not end there. While the neighborhood did not gentrify as a whole, the portion served by the Penn-sponsored public K-8 school experienced drastic change. As the blocks inside the school's catchment grew wealthier, more homogeneous, and more educated, these upward trends masked continued socioeconomic decline in the remainder of the neighborhood.
Introduction
Across the United States, universities are doing more than attracting students, generating graduates, and developing research. Academic institutions are playing key roles in civic leadership while influencing the landscape of their neighborhoods, cities, and regions. As cities strive to develop and sustain a place for themselves in the knowledge economy, urban universities represent critical stakeholders with the capacity to contribute to regional economic development in powerful and groundbreaking ways (Goddard and Vallance 2013) . In the midst of pursuing institutional agendas focused on research innovation, regional economies, and globalization-often in partnership with city or regional entities-urban universities are also increasingly aware of the physical and socioeconomic challenges at their doorstep. In response, university missions and actions are reflecting a new paradigm of active engagement (Perry 2008) .
In the United States, nearly 2,000 institutions of higher education are located in central cities, representing more than half of all universities and colleges in the country (Coalition of Urban Serving Universities 2010; Initiative for a Competitive Inner City and CEOs for Cities 2002). These urban universities are often among the largest employers and landowners within their host cities, generating massive economic development impacts (Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009) . For example, in 1996 (the last known data available), urban universities spent $136 billion on salaries, goods, and services; employed two million workers, two-thirds of which were in nonfaculty administrative and support positions; and owned more than $100 billion in fixed assets (i.e., land and buildings) in cities (Initiative for a Competitive Inner City and CEOs for Cities 2002). Similarly, in 2010, universities, including their affiliated medical centers, in the five major cities of the Northeast Corridor collectively employed nearly a million people; claimed nearly $100 billion in aggregated operating budgets; and attracted $28 billion in sponsored programs, gifts, and contracts (Birch 2013) .
Beyond their economic contributions, urban universities have a large physical presence within their communities. Their assets include significant amounts of fixed capital-primarily real estate holdings and infrastructurewhich tend to make universities less mobile than other corporations (CEOs for Cities 2007; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009) . Their strong ties to place-derived Ehlenz not only from physical investments but also, sometimes, from institutional missions-make universities a prominent example of "anchor institutions" in cities. This rootedness contributes to their increasing awareness of the challenges facing urban neighborhoods, which can include disinvestment, poverty, and safety concerns.
As cities struggled to intervene in neighborhood disinvestment during the 1980s and 1990s, some urban universities began to engage with neighborhoods as anchor institutions. A variety of circumstances motivated their actions, including threats to institutional constituencies (i.e., students, faculty, and staff); jeopardy to economic and institutional assets, including the ability to attract resources and talent; and obligations to the community via urban-driven mission statements. In many cases, some or all of these motivations drove universities to act. They responded with diverse place-based interventions, often designed to stabilize the neighborhood's conditions, induce improvement, and/or catalyze broad revitalization via private investment.
Today, a number of universities across the United States are engaged in some form of physical neighborhood intervention, including both public and private institutions. For each university, the neighborhood conditions and method of community engagement vary. For instance, Harvard University is investing in neighborhood revitalization as part of its campus expansion plans in Boston's Allston neighborhood. In addition to investing in new university facilities, Harvard is leveraging private development to generate new activity along an underutilized commercial corridor and contributing to neighborhood stabilization through a community benefits agreement. Syracuse University is supporting a multifaceted community revitalization initiative, executed by a separate community-focused nonprofit organization. Their neighborhood mission includes affordable homeownership opportunities, commercial and economic development, public transportation and infrastructure improvements, an arts and culture district integrating university and community arts stakeholders, and public health initiatives. Collectively, their efforts represent a partnership between the university, the City, and community-based organizations. And Johns Hopkins University is collaborating with a number of philanthropic and government stakeholders to pursue the redevelopment of a severely disinvested neighborhood in East Baltimore. The partners established a separate nonprofit entity, East Baltimore Development, Inc. (EBDI), to engage with institutional and community stakeholders and implement the intervention. Ongoing efforts include investments in public amenities, the development of new commercial and residential properties, and the recent opening of a new public school to serve neighborhood residents and employees.
baseline-through the most recent data available (2010) . The 2000 Census serves as a proxy for the start of the WPI, as it roughly coincides with the implementation of the full spectrum of WPI programs and investments. Given the changing scope of Census data between 2000 and 2010, five-year estimates from the ACS provide continuity in the socioeconomic indicators.
The units of analysis include Census tracts and block groups. The first assessment uses Census tracts to compare University City with the larger West Philadelphia area. 1 The second assessment takes a closer look at change in portions of University City; it utilizes Census block groups to better approximate the catchment area boundaries and accommodate a detailed analysis. The city of Philadelphia serves as a reference to macro-level changes throughout the analysis.
The University City study area is divided into two subareas ( Figure 1 ). The first is comprised of the 10 block groups located in the Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander University of Pennsylvania Partnership School catchment area, more commonly referred to as the Penn Alexander School (PAS). These 10 block groups received the full array of WPI interventions, including access to enrollment in the Penn-sponsored neighborhood public school. The second subarea includes the portions of University City outside of the PAS catchment, defined as all block groups located in the University City boundary, exclusive of those groups also in the PAS catchment. These block groups received most of the WPI interventions, excluding access to the PAS.
To evaluate neighborhood change between 1990 and 2010, the study considers three major categories of indicators. The first category emphasizes demographic trends, including changes in total population and racial composition. The second focuses on socioeconomic trends, including poverty and median household incomes. The final category considers housing trends, including dwelling units, vacancy rates, tenure status, and median home values. Taken together, these indicators define the neighborhood's character before the WPI, as well as the changes that have occurred as revitalization initiatives have progressed.
This study represents an important change in the urban anchor institution conversation. It moves beyond the "who" and "how" of university-neighborhood interventions and begins to ask, "what happened?" There is, however, an important limitation to this research. This article uses descriptive statistics to discuss patterns of demographic and socioeconomic change in a treatment neighborhood (i.e., University City); it employs reference neighborhoods to account for larger neighborhood or citywide trends that may have contributed to the changes observed in University City, including the city of Philadelphia and West Philadelphia. This method can suggest correlations between Penn's interventions and University City's trajectory between 1990 and 2010, illustrating divergent patterns in the treatment neighborhood versus the reference neighborhoods. The research cannot, however, establish a causal relationship between Penn's investments in the WPI and neighborhood change in University City. While an analysis that quantifies the impact of university interventions is a critical area for future research, the literature also recognizes the need for broader outcome-based evaluations of university-neighborhood engagement over time (Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009) . This study begins to address this void through its assessment of neighborhood change.
Literature Review: The Evolving Relationship Between Town and Gown
The literature review for this study centers on the interactions between universities and their host neighborhoods-often referred to as "town and gown," as well as the evolution of university-community engagement (Goddard and Vallance 2013; Perry and Wiewel 2005) . Historically, universities have been largely removed from the context and character of their urban locations, seeking to establish scholarly enclaves away from the chaos of cities. Many universities, including Penn, were initially established in an urban core, only to relocate to a more pastoral location to escape rapid urbanization during the late nineteenth century (Perry and Wiewel 2005; Rodin 2005 ). Urbanization, however, soon followed, and universities were, once again, situated in the midst of dense city environments. By the time the Great Depression and World War II (WWII) came to pass, many urban universities were anchored in disinvested neighborhoods experiencing "white flight" (O'Mara 2005; Rodin 2005) . Their institutional response, aided and abetted by federal resources, represents an early example of university-community engagement; it would have long-lasting repercussions for university-community relations.
Universities and Place in the Post-WWII Landscape
During the 1940s, as the United States fought in WWII, the federal government was investing in scientific research and higher education access that would move the nation into the modern era (Mumper et al. 2011; O'Mara 2005) . The federal call for innovation, funded with grant monies, placed new demands on research universities across the country. Institutions needed to expand to accommodate burgeoning student enrollments, backed by the GI Bill, as well as growing medical and laboratory facilities. This period coincided with federal legislation that supported slum clearance and redevelopment projects within urban centers, also known as Urban Renewal (Birch and Silver 2009; Hall 1996; Teaford 2000) ; it paved the way for some universities to simultaneously erase blight from adjacent neighborhoods and fulfill campus expansion needs.
Urban Renewal fostered a David versus Goliath dynamic between communities and their universities. For some, this legacy continues to shape university-community interactions. Meanwhile, university investments in slum clearance fundamentally changed the fabric of neighborhoods, often resulting in three outcomes (Carriere 2011; Winling 2011) . First, universities and cities alike viewed the program as an opportunity to "clean house," clearing away physical, social, and economic blight in the name of "improvement" (Teaford 2000; Winling 2011) . Broad displacement and demolition frequently preceded the development of new university facilities, including libraries, dorms, and laboratories. Yet, many Urban Renewal plans were overly ambitious and did not come to fruition, in part or in whole. In those instances, which include Penn's work in University City, universities cleared people and buildings from large tracts of land that remained vacant for decades (Cohen 1998) .
Second, Modernist architecture inspired Urban Renewal era projects, creating real and perceived barriers between a campus and its neighborhoods (Carriere 2011) . Frequently, redevelopment plans reorganized buildings along an internal spine or a "college green." This physical composition reinforced the vision of universities as academic enclaves, while establishing a clear divide between an institution and its community-sometimes with sparse architectural cues or, in other cases, literal walls (Cohen 1998) . In 1956, Penn, in partnership with Philadelphia's City Planning Commission, converted Locust Street, a vehicular artery running through campus, into Locust Walk, a vehicle-free pedestrian promenade. The conversion supported the reconfiguration of Penn around a central (and internal) pedestrian spine, with buildings turning their backs-both literally, in terms of loading zones and refuse collection, and figuratively-to the surrounding community.
Last, universities and their host cities proceeded to accomplish Urban Renewal projects in ways that artificially engaged affected communities, at best, or excluded neighborhoods entirely (Carriere 2011; Cohen 1998; Teaford 2000) . Ultimately, the hegemonic nature of Urban Renewal bred mistrust and animosity in neighborhoods, aimed at "ivory tower" institutions and city government. These feelings defined university-community relationships for decades.
Universities and Place Today: A New Era of Engagement
Urban trends tend to be cyclical, and university-community engagement is not an exception. Following the top-down engagement of the 1950s and 1960s, urban institutions largely disengaged from their neighborhoods and returned to their scholarly enclave roots. Slum clearance efforts had substantively mitigated many of the issues plaguing university neighborhoods, and upward economic trends helped to stabilize communities through the 1970s. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, an economic downturn, augmented by rising crime and disinvestment rates, meant that several urban universities faced neighborhood blight once again. This time, institutions responded differently.
Since the 1990s, the universities have increasingly prioritized community engagement and evolved beyond previous town-gown models (Benson and Harkavy 2000; Harkavy 2006 ). Similar to the 1940s, many urban universities have watched their neighborhoods deteriorate, threatening fixed assets and student safety, not to mention institutional reputations (Perry and Wiewel 2005; Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009; Rodin 2005) . They also continue to believe they have self-interest in the health of their neighborhoods. However, Urban Renewal's contentious and difficult lessons have changed the tenor of the university-community conversation, and university administrators increasingly support new strategies for working with neighborhoods to secure their mutual future. This "enlightened" self-interest (SunguEryilmaz 2009) has sparked a new ethos of university-community engagement, as well as a generation of university-led neighborhood revitalization investments, that permeates present-day scholarship.
Much of the current university-community literature emphasizes case studies. Cases are mostly written from the university's perspective, highlighting the factors motivating an institution to act and the types of investments and/or programs included in the initiative. For instance, Bromley and Kent (2006) profiled the University System of Ohio and efforts by four urban campuses within that public system-Ohio State University, University of Cincinnati, University of Akron, and Youngstown State University-to invest in the revitalization of their neighborhoods. The authors set each university within its community context before discussing the major problems that sparked university involvement (e.g., physical deterioration and vacancy, increasing crime, neighborhood complaints over student housing conditions and behavior). Subsequently, they discuss the types of projects each university has pursued. For example, the Ohio State University emphasized increased beautification and public safety initiatives, homeownership incentive programs, and mixed-use development projects to catalyze new private investment. The University of Cincinnati spurred revitalization by providing funds to and serving on the boards of five neighborhood community development corporations (CDCs), one for each of its adjacent neighborhoods. This strategy moves the institution into a partnership role with the neighborhood, rather than a leadership role. Several other books, articles, and reports emphasize other approaches universities are taking as urban property owners and real estate developers, economic engines, neighborhood partners, and civic leaders (e.g., Bunnell and Lawson 2006; Martin, Smith, and Phillips 2005; Maurrasse 2001; Mayfield and Lucas 2000; Perry, Wiewel, and Menendez 2009; Sungu-Eryilmaz 2009) .
Another subset of the literature champions the anchor institution movement. 2 This body of work frequently highlights successful examples of university-community engagement and advocates for best practices in the field. Strong institutional leadership and campus-wide commitment are among the most commonly cited revitalization best practices for universities. The most transformative efforts move beyond one-time investments to find intersections between a university's standard business practices and policies (e.g., purchasing policies, vendor contracts, hiring policies) and a community's assets and needs (e.g., neighborhood businesses, local workforce, entrepreneurship resources). Additional best practices include strategic (and focused) targeting of resources, established partnerships with neighborhood stakeholders, a balance between university and community needs and goals, and deployment strategies that address the entire community-physically, economically, and socially. In addition, this body of literature frequently makes a case for universities to become (and be recognized as) active civic stakeholders within urban neighborhoods. By virtue of an institution's de facto economic, educational, and physical contributions, authors argue that a university is a natural partner in neighborhood (and city) revitalization efforts.
University Revitalization Research: Pushing Back and Unanswered Questions
The anchor institution literature, to date, largely favors universitycommunity engagement and revitalization strategies. Many articles criticize the legacy of universities-and other institutions-in urban neighborhoods, but those critiques are primarily set in Urban Renewal (e.g., Carriere 2011; Pritchett 2003; Teaford 2000; Winling 2011 ). In contrast, there are few critical assessments of recent university investments in neighborhoods (e.g., Etienne 2012).
Etienne's (2012) book, Pushing Back the Gates, represents one of the most visible critical accounts of university-community engagement. The work examines Penn's investment in West Philadelphia through the eyes of a subset of neighborhood stakeholders. The participants in his study raised serious questions about the motivations of the institution and the balance between costs and benefits borne by the neighborhood over the course of the WPI. Yet, Etienne's book is challenged by one major shortcoming-The qualitative sample is narrow and represents a limited segment of the West Philadelphia population. While the study's scope does not invalidate its findings, it does constrain its ability to offer generalizable insights and limits its usefulness when evaluating the highly complex nature of neighborhood revitalization.
Presently, the popular press is more likely to publish negative reviews of university interventions, including city and university newspapers and community blogs. Often, their criticisms are leveled at university expansion and affiliated development projects. Columbia University's major campus expansion in the Manhattanville neighborhood of New York City provides an example, with significant (and vocal) criticisms over displacement, development scale, and lack of meaningful community engagement published in the New York Times (Eviatar 2006; Williams 2006) , the student-run Columbia Spectator (Kappner 2013) , and community newspapers and websites (Huffman 2007; Moore 2014) .
Gentrification is another hotly debated issue in university revitalization efforts, although, here too, it is more common to find neighborhood stakeholder and advocate protests to recent university investments in the popular press than in the academic literature. For instance, as this article will later consider, residents and neighborhood organizations have charged Penn with inciting gentrification in West Philadelphia. When the university began redeveloping its primary commercial corridor, which divides the campus from the neighborhood, community activists accused Penn of "McPenntrification"-a play on words originating from the university's attempts to relocate a well-used McDonald's from the area. The neighborhood group alleged Penn's efforts were gentrifying the community, displacing the existing residents and businesses. Over time, "Mc-" has been dropped, but "Penntrification" remains a concern for the community (Amborebieta 2001a (Amborebieta , 2001b McQuade 2004) .
In the realm of academic scholarship, a small segment of literature describes the propensity of university-community partnerships to (unhelpfully) blur the lines between fantasy and reality (Baum 2000) . This perspective warns universities and communities to be realistic in their expectations, in addition to implying neighborhoods are best served when they have someone directly advocating for their needs (Baum 2000; Duenes et al. 2001; Reardon 2006; Vidal et al. 2002) . These articles are hopeful, identifying the possibilities for universities and neighborhoods and often seeking to identify ways to improve the process. To this point, scholars are increasingly calling for assessment of university interventions and evaluation of the returns on those investments for both the institution and the community, but few studies have been published at this point (Dubb, McKinley, and 
The WPI: Penn's Investment in Place
In the early 1990s, University City, and the larger West Philadelphia community, reflected the experience of many neighborhoods across the city of Philadelphia, as well as urban centers across the country (Kromer 2010; Kromer and Kerman 2005; Rodin 2007 ). High crime rates, property abandonment and disinvestment, increasing poverty levels, and declining public schools characterized the neighborhood. Meanwhile, the City was on the verge of bankruptcy and unable to make the kinds of investments required to reverse University City's decline. For years, Penn's administration had carefully observed the deteriorating conditions along the campus borders, but its discussions were brought to a head following the murders of two members of the university community in 1994 and 1996. Motivated by real and perceived threats to its physical campus and constituents, Penn faced a dilemma familiar to many urban anchor institutions-fight or flight (Rodin 2005 ).
Philadelphia's fiscal crisis meant that the City was an unlikely leader for revitalization in University City; if Penn wished to stay and fight for its neighborhood, the administration understood it would have to change what it meant to be an engaged neighborhood stakeholder. According to a universitycommissioned report, Penn saw four potential responses to their environment: (1) engage in community service activities with the neighborhood, knowing that these activities may not address decline in a significant way; (2) reconceive of the Penn campus as a fortress, building walls, gates, and checkpoints to barricade the institution from decline; (3) vacate the existing West Philadelphia campus and relocate to a more stable location; or (4) develop a broad neighborhood revitalization strategy supported by substantial institutional resources (Kromer and Kerman 2005) . Ultimately, Penn's administration, led by President Judith Rodin, concluded that moving away was not feasible-Penn's campus was at risk, but its identity and assets were also deeply tied to West Philadelphia. Furthermore, building a fortress would not change the reality for the university and could seriously hamper its ability to attract future students and faculty. Thus, President Rodin elected to invest in the fourth alternative, committing to neighborhood revitalization for the long term and rebranding University City as an asset (Kromer and Kerman 2005; Rodin 2007 ).
The WPI: Penn's Approach to Neighborhood Revitalization
Penn organized the WPI around a 5-point platform that was designed to catalyze holistic neighborhood improvement. The appendix summarizes each of the major WPI focus areas, including its objectives, programs and projects, and the various programmatic results and status. Broadly, Penn's approach sought to leverage the university's financial, organizational, and human capital to improve the neighborhood and catalyze outside investment. As the university launched each element of the WPI, phased in over a period of five years, it addressed immediate needs-namely, safety and neighborhood services-while envisioning University City (UC) as a vibrant neighborhood of choice over the long term.
Since the inception of the WPI circa 1996, Penn has tracked its public safety and commercial development investments. Penn's public safety and lighting investments have contributed to a significant reduction in crime, a critical factor behind the WPI's inception. Between 1996 and 2009, the number of safety personnel employed by or affiliated with Penn more than doubled from 269 personnel to 618. The UC Bright program facilitated the installment of more than 850 pedestrian lights, focused on commercial corridors and residential properties throughout the district. Reported crimes against property and person decreased by 50% between 1996 and 2009, from 1,589 crimes to 797 (Department of Public Safety, University of Pennsylvania 2010).
From a development standpoint, the addition of several new commercial and retail services along the western border of the Penn campus and University City neighborhoods has dramatically changed the character of the area. Since 1998, Penn has invested $165 million in University City development projects, including a neighborhood grocery store, movie theater, restaurants, and a hotel; in doing so, the university has leveraged more than $700 million in private capital (Division of Facilities and Real Estate Services, University of Pennsylvania 2012). These projects contribute more than 400,000 square feet of retail space to the neighborhood with occupancy rates consistently outpacing Center City rates between 2003 and 2010.
Discussion
Penn's investment in University City represents one of the preeminent cases of university-led neighborhood revitalization initiatives; its model has been widely replicated by urban universities across the country (Bromley 2006; Perry and Wiewel 2005) . While self-preservation was a strong motivator for the development of the WPI, the resulting neighborhood revitalization strategy has redefined the traditional town-gown relationship from one of hostility, at worse, and tolerance, at best, to one of enhanced university-community engagement (Martin, Smith, and Phillips 2005) . However, Penn's strategy must be carefully analyzed to understand the limitations, consequences, and impacts, both intended and unintended, for neighborhood change.
The remainder of this article explores patterns of socioeconomic and demographic change in University City. It begins with a brief discussion of neighborhood change in the city of Philadelphia, which provides context for University City's experience. Subsequently, the discussion turns to change in University City and the larger West Philadelphia neighborhood, as well as disaggregated change within University City in relation to the PAS catchment area.
Setting the Context: Philadelphia Between 1990 and 2010
Philadelphia's long-term trajectory follows that of many former-manufacturing centers across the Northeastern and Midwestern United States. Following six consecutive decades of population loss, the 2010 Census registered Philadelphia's first population increase with a gain of approximately 8,500 people (Table 1 ). In terms of racial composition, a minority-majority population continues to characterize the city. While the White population decreased by more than 222,000 people between 1990 and 2010, the Black population remained fairly steady (4.73% increase) and the Asian population more than doubled (a gain of nearly 53,000 people).
On the wealth front, Philadelphia's poverty rate steadily increased over the past two decades to 25.1% in 2010; correspondingly, its median household income dropped by $7,000 (constant 2010 dollars). Home values across the city rose during the study period, although the median value remained modest at $135,200. Rather than signaling an affordable housing stock, however, the median value is an indication of wide variation in the city's housing market, which will become evident later in the analysis. Last, homeownership in Philadelphia remained higher than many urban centers, but fell consistently from 62% to 54.1% in the past two decades.
By all accounts, Philadelphia was in 1990, and continued to be in 2010, a city struggling to stabilize its economic base. While the overall population experienced a recent (and modest) rebound, there were significant demographic shifts at play. Furthermore, population increases did not turn the tide on increasing poverty rates and decreasing household wealth across the city. At the same time, there were pockets of investment and neighborhood change in Philadelphia between 1990 and 2010, including University City.
A Parting of Ways: University City and Its West Philadelphia Neighborhood
University City's socioeconomic trajectory between 1990 and 2010 is mixed ( Table 1) . The total population remained relatively steady throughout the period, increasing by less than 1,500 people over 20 years. However, the neighborhood's racial composition underwent a fair amount of change. In 1990, before the WPI, the neighborhood's population was 50% White, 35% Black, and 11% Asian; during the subsequent decade (2000) , the White population decreased by nearly 4,000 people, whereas the Black and Asian populations increased by 1,839 and 1,426 people, respectively. This trend, however, was reversed during the WPI decade. Between 2000 and 2010, the White population rebounded to 1990 levels, and the Asian population continued to grow; conversely, the Black population experienced a significant decrease, losing nearly 6,500 people (a 29.34% decrease from 1990). Wealth in University City flagged over the course of the study period and remained below that of the city. When the WPI began in 2000, the poverty rate in University City reached 35.38%-a full 13 percentage points above the city of Philadelphia, and it remained at 31.67% a decade later. Unsurprisingly, the median household income for University City mirrored the poverty trends. In the whole of University City, median household incomes, adjusted to 2010 dollars, fell 17.68% between 1990 ($37,900) and 2010 ($31,200) and remained roughly $5,000 below that of the city median.
Last, over the course of the last 20 years, University City experienced greater demand for housing: In 2000, the vacancy rate peaked at 16.31%, before falling to 9.29% a decade later. During the same period, the total number of dwelling units declined by 2,000. This decrease likely signals the demolition of blighted properties and conversion of multifamily homes back to their original single-family structures, which will be discussed more in the next section. Homeownership across the neighborhood also remained low, but steady, at approximately 17%, fluctuating less than a percentage point during the study period.
To understand what these trends really mean and to surmise any correlation with the WPI at all, University City must be set into the context of its broader West Philadelphia neighborhood, which is comprised of a much larger area from Penn's campus along the western banks of the Schuylkill River to the city's western edge. Penn has long served as an anchoring force in University City, providing an economic engine and a natural flow of faculty and student residents for the neighborhood. While Penn's strength may have moderated some of the socioeconomic trends, during the 1990 to 2000 period, University City shared many of the distressed characteristics of the larger West Philadelphia community.
On all accounts (population, poverty, median household incomes, and residential vacancy and tenure), University City was in step with the larger neighborhood trends during the pre-WPI period. Population increased throughout West Philadelphia between 1990 and 2000, but so did poverty rates. Meanwhile, incomes diminished substantially-more than $14,000 across West Philadelphia and nearly $7,000 in the smaller University City area. The demographic profiles revealed that Whites were leaving the neighborhood, although the University City portion of the neighborhood remained integrated relative to West Philadelphia, where Black residents represented more than 90% of the population in 1990 and 80% in 2000. Vacancy rates were on the rise throughout the area, but so were median home values. In 2000, University City's median home value was nearly one and a half times greater than the median value across West Philadelphia-$125,600 versus $51,600 (constant 2010 dollars).
During the 2000 to 2010 period that coincides with the WPI, University City did experience a rebound-or at least a softer landing-diverging from the broader West Philadelphia area in subtle ways. The overall population increased throughout West Philadelphia between 2000 and 2010 (8.57% or 17,448 people), but University City residents were more likely to be White (20.69% increase between 2000 and 2010) and claimed more wealth. As median incomes fell across West Philadelphia ($23,900 in 2000 to $20,900 in 2010), the University City portion of the neighborhood showed an improvement of $2,500 ($31,200). The vacancy rate held steady at 14.5% in West Philadelphia, but dropped below 10% in University City by 2010-a decrease of 7 percentage points. Meanwhile, homeownership rates remained steady, but low, at 17% in University City, while falling nearly 6% in the greater neighborhood to 45.8%. Most significantly, median home values in the University City portion of the neighborhood skyrocketed by 2010, increasing more than $200,000 in constant 2010 dollars to $326,400. Conversely, the larger West Philadelphia neighborhood experienced only a modest increase ($28,000 between 2000 and 2010) to a median home value of $79,600 in 2010-an increase that University City's growth certainly contributed to by skewing the median home value upward.
Taken together, these indicators suggest that the WPI did make a distinct impression in University City relative to the larger West Philadelphia neighborhood. In some respects, the university's presence always differentiated University City from the rest of West Philadelphia-It attracted its own constituents (faculty and students) to the area, fostering a natural demand for housing and modestly higher median incomes. Despite this, the trends portray a pre-WPI neighborhood that was eroding in many of the same ways as the broader West Philadelphia, as well as a subtle improvement in University City after Penn began investing. These deviating patterns suggest a correlation between Penn's intervention and neighborhood improvement.
Disaggregating University City: Inside and Outside of the PAS Catchment Area
If University City's trends diverged from West Philadelphia and showed modest improvement during the WPI years, disaggregating the neighborhood to account for the presence of a strong neighborhood school shows an even greater improvement gap (Table 2) . Before the WPI began, the whole of University City, as previously discussed, was experiencing disinvestment. Declining trends in the area closest to campus, which would later be served by the PAS, were slightly less steep, but they remained readily apparent; decline in the area beyond the future PAS catchment was more severe.
In the years preceding the WPI, University City's overall population was relatively stable. A look past the surface reveals much more fluctuation: Between 1990 and 2000, the blocks inside the PAS lost more than 20% of its population base or nearly 3,400 people, while the remainder of University City gained 5,865 people (a 20% increase). Conversely, the trends reverse during the WPI years: The PAS gained 9% of its population back and the area outside of the PAS declined by nearly 2,200 people (a 6% decrease).
With respect to the composition of residents, the narrative shifts toward proportions rather than absolute numbers. As indicated above, the total population within the PAS fluctuated between 1990 and 2010, resulting in a 14.18% decrease over 20 years. The White population accounted for most of this loss, shrinking by 18.57% between 1990 and 2010; however, all of that loss was realized during the 1990 to 2000 period, when the White population decreased by more than 4,000 (43.37% decline). From 2000 to 2010, the White population regained 2,294 people, bringing the overall proportion of Whites in the PAS to 55%. The Asian population experienced a similar pattern: It decreased by 25% between 1990 and 2000 (548 people), before adding 826 people (49% increase) between 2000 and 2010, for an overall increase of 12.53% during the study period. By 2010, the Asian population represented 18% of PAS residents, as compared with 14% in 1990. The Black population in the PAS experienced an opposing trend. While it increased by almost 800 people (20%) between 1990 and 2000, the area lost nearly half of its Black population (2, 250 people) during the subsequent decade. Whereas the neighborhood was 37% Black in 2000, the proportion decreased sharply to 17% by 2010. Outside of the PAS catchment, the White and Asian populations increased between 1990 and 2010 (12.43% and 117.06%, respectively) . The Black population also grew between 1990 and 2000 (10% increase or 1,231 people), but fell steeply in the following decade (4,353 people or a 33% decrease). Between 1990 and 2010, the proportion of Whites outside of the PAS remained constant (46%), but the proportion of Blacks decreased sharply from 41% to 27% and Asians increased substantially from 10% to 19% of the area.
Anecdotally, the impression is that the PAS zone changed most significantly during the WPI, yet a review of demographic changes suggests otherwise. The portions of University City within the PAS did change with sharp population decreases (White and Asian) and increases (Black) in the 1990 to 2000 period, followed by a reversal for each of the population groups in the subsequent decade. However, the analysis of racial composition suggests that the remainder of University City also underwent dramatic change over the last 20+ years with White and Asian populations steadily increasing, while the Black population dropped sharply after 2000.
When considering wealth, the areas inside and outside of the PAS are located on opposite ends of the spectrum. Within the PAS catchment, Census data confirm what many have long suspected: After holding steady at approximately 30% during 1990 and 2000, the poverty rate decreased by nearly 5 percentage points to 25.98% in 2010-close to the city's 25.1% poverty rate. Median household incomes also show marked improvement: They fell by $4,700 between 1990 and 2000, but rebounded to $41,300 by 2010-a 34% increase over 2000 incomes. These changes countered downward trends in the city and West Philadelphia, putting the PAS area well above their median income levels ($36,300 and $20,900, respectively). Outside of the PAS, however, the story is fairly grim. In 1990, the poverty rate was 31.1%; the rate increased to 38.17% in 2000-higher than the city (22.9%) or West Philadelphia (30.2%) at that time-and decreased only slightly to 35.36% by 2010, which remained above the city and West Philadelphia. Whereas median household incomes outside of the PAS exceeded those inside the PAS before the WPI ($38,800 and $35,600, respectively), they fell precipitously in the following decade and stabilized at $27,200 in 2010 (29.9% decrease) .
In an economic sense, the area inside the PAS fared substantially better than the rest of University City, overcoming losses in income and increases in poverty experienced during the 1990s and realizing significant gains during the WPI period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . The neighborhood outside of the PAS is characterized by continued decline-median household incomes fell by 30% between 1990 and 2010 and its poverty rate exceeded the city's, as well as the PAS area's, by approximately 10% in 2010. The overall trends for University City, discussed previously, mask the observed socioeconomic divergence between the areas inside and outside of the catchment zone. In fact, it appears that the PAS area served as the bright spot in University City during the WPI years, while the remainder of the neighborhood experienced continued economic decline.
Housing trends are the last major category of neighborhood change, further distinguishing the PAS area from the remainder of University City. Over the last 20 years, the total number of dwelling units in University City decreased by 9.78% (approximately 2,000 units). This decline is comprised of the area inside of the PAS, which lost more than 700 units during the first decade and added approximately 170 during the second, and the area outside of the PAS, where dwelling units increased by more than 2,500 in the first period, followed by a loss of nearly 4,000 units between 2000 and 2010. While Census data do not account for the drivers behind these trends, one explanation is the demolition of vacant units and restoration of previously subdivided rowhomes and single-family structures. Vacancy rates in the PAS support this hypothesis, as they steadily fell from 11.54% (1990) to 7.58% (2010). Outside of the PAS, the story is less straightforward: Dwelling units decreased by 26% between 2000 and 2010, despite the addition of several new multifamily buildings in the area adjacent to Penn's campus. However, here too, the most likely explanation is demolition in the neighborhood. The vacancy rate supports this theory: Between 1990 and 2000, the vacancy rate outside of the PAS increased sharply from 13.08% to 29.36%; this was followed by an equally steep decrease to 10.38% in 2010. The sharp decline in vacancy and dwelling units suggests that a number of structures were demolished after 2000; by 2010 some sites had been redeveloped, but others remain vacant.
As described earlier, a major thrust of the WPI was to increase homeownership, thereby mitigating abandonment and stabilizing blocks within University City. While 1,000 university-affiliated households have participated in Penn's homeownership and home rehabilitation programs since 1998, nearly 46,500 people lived in the neighborhood in 2010. How much of an effect could these programs have? The answer appears to be not very much.
The homeownership rate in Philadelphia has been historically high relative to many urban centers; although it was decreasing throughout the study period, the city remained a majority homeowner city in 2010. West Philadelphia has also traditionally been comprised of homeowners. By comparison, University City has long been a renter-majority neighborhood with ownership not exceeding 20%. This is not surprising, given the neighborhood's association with a college campus, but it is not the only explanation. According to Penn's Department of Residential Services, in 2013, approximately 27% of Penn undergraduates (2,800) and 30% of graduate students (3,500) lived off-campus in University City-a stark improvement over the mid-1990s. Yet, Penn's estimated off-campus student population accounts for less than 15% of the neighborhood's total population and, geographically speaking, the concentration of students tends to diminish as one moves beyond a three-to four-block radius from campus. While there are other institutions in the neighborhood, including Drexel University, University of the Sciences, and several hospitals, there are other explanations for the tenure status of the neighborhood. Beyond its institutional affiliations, University City's density, housing typology, including rowhomes and midsized multifamily buildings, and proximity to Philadelphia's core likely enable the neighborhood to serve as an extension of the Center City housing market. The character of this urban neighborhood attracts a subset of households who desire a vibrant, urban experience in a downtown-adjacent location.
Taken together, these factors contextualize the fundamentally different homeownership conditions in University City. Despite the WPI's emphasis, the neighborhood's homeownership rate remained steady. Inside of the PAS, owner-occupancy increased slightly from 14.53% in 1990 to 17.84% by 2010; conversely, homeownership rates fell outside of the PAS catchment. Despite claiming incrementally more owner-occupants than the PAS area in 1990 (17.89%) and 2000 (19.13%), the homeownership rate outside of the PAS decreased to 16.01% in 2010.
In contrast to tenure, the median home value for owner-occupied properties changed dramatically between 1990 and 2010. Since the 2000s, anecdotal knowledge has been that home values with University City, generally, and inside the PAS, specifically, have increased substantially. Although Census data do not provide the same degree of specificity as real estate transaction or tax assessment data, it remains a useful indicator of change within the neighborhood. Between 1990 and 2000, the blocks inside and outside of the future PAS catchment realized modest increases in their median home values. Inside the PAS, the median home value grew by approximately $30,000; outside of the PAS, median values rose more modestly, increasing by $8,000. During the subsequent decade (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , the median values increase exponentially; values inside the PAS more than doubled (from $154,500 to $334,600) and those outside the PAS nearly tripled (from $107,900 to $300,900). While the Census figures suggest a $34,000 gap between homes inside and outside of the PAS catchment, a more detailed assessment of real estate transactions in University City (Steif, 2013 ) estimated a $100,000+ price differential.
Implications
Based upon a 20-year assessment of Census trends, it appears that University City has experienced a distinct shift in the composition of its neighborhood, though the changes were not uniform. While many of University City's indicators trended toward revitalization and growth, the reality is that the PAS often claimed more than its "share" of positive change and, as a result, buoyed the remainder of the neighborhood. Structural changes to the population, made evident by shifts in the racial composition, occurred throughout University City; meanwhile socioeconomic and housing trends inside of the PAS catchment diverged from the remainder of University City, as well as the larger West Philadelphia area.
Penn employed many strategies that the literature now classifies as best practices. It targeted its resources in a specific location and invested in interventions that would resolve market failures (e.g., crime and safety, public amenities and services, distressed properties), thereby priming the neighborhood for private investment in the future. These investments add up to an attraction strategy for University City, stabilizing the market and providing higher quality amenities (e.g., a strong neighborhood school, new retail options, improved public spaces) to stimulate new demand. In this respect, the WPI has been a great success. Yet, while the WPI satisfied many of Penn's criteria for neighborhood improvement, the analysis is relatively ambiguous from the perspective of the community. Across University City, and especially inside of the PAS, the worst indicators showed some improvement between 1990 and 2010, in spite of worsening trends in West Philadelphia. Significant improvement, however, is not uniformly evident, and socioeconomic indicators outside the PAS remain well below those of the city, as well as nearby blocks located within the PAS catchment.
On the housing front, the analysis points to an increase in demand and a constrained housing market, clearly distinguishing University City from the rest of West Philadelphia. Within University City, the implications are more nuanced. Inside of the PAS, rising home values occurred in tandem with rising incomes, falling poverty rates, and a significant shift in the racial composition. Collectively, these indicators point toward the gentrification of the PAS catchment, as new households were attracted to the neighborhood by a strong school and enhanced urban amenities, bringing more wealth and housing competition with them. The PAS area, however, is not necessarily stable-The housing market has become quite restrictive, in terms of affordability and vacancy rate; it limits access for many households. Conversely, Census data suggest that housing demand outside of the PAS also increased, but it was decoupled from wealth gains. In other words, even as housing became more expensive, the population was less equipped to shoulder the burden, illustrated by decreasing incomes and increasing poverty rates. Moving forward, Penn's neighborhoods grapple with two opposing forces. On one end, declining trends are still evident in parts of the University City neighborhood. Yet, in the PAS area, the perva-sive concerns include limited housing affordability and decreasing housing supply.
The neighborhood change analysis clearly suggests that Penn's approach was most transformative in the area receiving the highest concentration of resources and opportunity. The presence of a strong neighborhood school, complemented by the WPI's other safety, economic development, and housing investments, appears to have been the winning factor for improvement. Like the PAS blocks, the area outside of the PAS is served by a public K-8 school-Lea Elementary School (Lea); and, like the PAS, Lea receives curriculum support from Penn's Netter Center and the Graduate School of Education. However, the similarities end there. Unlike Lea, Penn's financial commitment to the PAS-its initial investment toward the school's development, as well as its annual contribution toward operations-makes smaller classroom sizes, specialized curriculum development, and capital improvements possible. These features have transformed the PAS into not just a beacon within Philadelphia's troubled school district, but one of the highest ranked schools in Pennsylvania.
Taken together, the transformation of the PAS area implies that strong neighborhood schools are a powerful tool in an anchor institution's efforts to stabilize and revitalize communities-and other institutions are taking note. Since Penn invested in the PAS, a number of urban universities have replicated the neighborhood school model in their revitalization strategies. For instance, Johns Hopkins University is a major contributor to the recently opened Henderson-Hopkins School, a K-8 public school and the centerpiece of EBDI's efforts to stabilize East Baltimore. The school represents one of the first major investments in the community in decades, providing early childhood education services and community spaces, in addition to the K-8 curriculum. Other universities have established K-12 partnerships, directing fiscal and human capital toward specific schools or public school districts. For example, Syracuse University is one of several partners involved in the "Say Yes to Education Syracuse" initiative, an effort that connects local partners to a national nonprofit foundation (Say Yes to Education) to provide year-round support to the Syracuse City School District students. It remains to be seen how these different styles of educational partnerships and investments will influence neighborhood revitalization or compare with University City's experience with the PAS, but the willingness of universities to commit financial resources to K-12 strategies indicates they think the benefits will be worth the cost.
Last, Penn's intervention in University City raises some very important questions about the roles anchor institutions play and their impacts on communities.
Across the United States, a growing number of urban universities are electing to dedicate fiscal and human resources to their neighborhoods. Their dollars are, arguably, supplementing, if not replacing, public goods traditionally supplied by the public sector, including public safety and policing and public amenities (e.g., parks, street trees, lighting). They are also intervening in "failed" markets, subsidizing real estate development in places ignored by the private market to catalyze new interest. This framing of the anchor institution phenomenon suggests two questions.
First, what role(s) should anchor institutions play in maintaining public goods? Some scholars suggest that anchor institutions have an obligation to practice democratic civic engagement, extending their institutional missions beyond traditional service learning and applied research commitments to respond to the physical, economic, and social challenges of the community (Benson and Harkavy 2000; Harkavy 2006; Harkavy and Axelroth Hodges 2012; Saltmarsh, Hartley, and Clayton 2009 ). This ideological position, however, is not simple or straightforward. Anchor institutions (e.g., universities, hospitals, performing arts centers) have a responsibility to multiple constituencies and, while they are place-based, their primary duty is often to their "internal" citizens (e.g., to educate, to heal, to provide arts and culture). In this respect, it is necessary for anchor institutions and communities to consider the balance among several, sometimes competing, missions. More importantly, what are the implications of devolving the traditional responsibility of local governments (i.e., the provision of public goods) to anchor institutions-organizations that are not democratically elected to represent a neighborhood and may, or may not, share the concerns of the area? Second, if urban universities are going to invest in public goods, what strategies generate the best rate of return for both the internal (i.e., university or anchor institution) and external (i.e., neighborhood) constituencies? Scholars and practitioners are beginning to raise this question, as they assess the current menu of anchor institution best practices and identify ways to generate shared institution-community value. Presently, few universities engage in any kind of evaluation of their neighborhood revitalization strategies. Without appraising if and how neighborhoods improve or if new problems arise, neither institutions nor communities can know if university investments in neighborhood revitalization are worth the realized benefits, much less the costs. Penn's support for workforce development programming is ongoing.
Contract with minorityowned (MBE) and womanowned businesses (WBE) in the construction trades with a goal of achieving 20% to 25% of total construction hours awarded for minority/ woman-owned businesses. 
